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[German Version] I. Assumptions – II. Catholic Social Teaching until Vatican II – III. Catholic Social Teaching since Vatican II – IV. Fundamental Concepts In the narrower sense, Catholic social teaching is the church's social teaching as expressed in texts issued by the teaching office; i…

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[German Version] Legitimacy relates to the justification of norms, institutions, legal entitlements, and claims to authority, together with their basis in moral and legal philosophy. With specific reference to the acceptance of authority (Dominion/Rule), M…

[German Version] expresses the purpose of social interaction, either in a general sense or in the specific sense given to it by politics and law. Precision in the use of the concept of common good is of fundamental importance for any type of social ethics (Protestant social ethics), as the normative definition of society and of its subsystems is dependent upon it. The often unnuanced invoking of the common good (“an empty phrase”) brings discredit to this major concern. “Common good” (Lat. bonum commune) is the translation of the Greek τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον/ to koinḗ symphéron. Aristotle employs it in the sense of justice (II; IV) to denote that specific political good which, as a purpose of the state, represents the very precondition for the good life of the citizens ( Pol. 1282b 14–18). In the reception of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, which plays an important role in the history of the concept, the c…

[German Version] in general usage denotes the distinctive quality of a person's behavior, which may be good or bad, just or unjust. This qualification, originally applied to action as such, is extended to the attitudes, opinions (Virtues, Vices), and character of the persons acting, and beyond that to institutions (Norms, systems). The occurrence of morality presupposes that human action is doubly motivated: (a) empirically and through the senses (Desire/Lack of desire); and (b) from practical rea…